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Most forecasters project 
growth at 2 to 3 percent 
over the next year, but 
not gaining sufficient 
momentum to advance 
safely above stall speed. 
P
ublic sentiment says the recession isn’t over. Never mind that 
the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), the arbiter 
of recessions, declared that the Great Recession of 2008 and 2009 officially 
ended in June 2009. An unrelenting pessimism constrains the recovery as 
consumers spend reluctantly while paying down debt, gripped by persis-
tent fears of unemployment. The economy grew at a 2.5 percent annualized 
pace in the third quarter, according to the second estimate of real gross 
domestic product (GDP), a moderate improvement after two quarters of 
decelerating growth during the recovery. This tepid expansion has raised 
concern that things could get worse again before getting better and that the 
likelihood of another recession may have risen.
Slowdown or Imminent Recession?
Does the slow growth necessarily foretell a double dip? Just as a bicycle 
requires momentum to stay upright, history tells us that once the economy 
slows to a sluggish growth rate, it will likely fall into a recession. This “stall 
speed” appears to be 2 percent annual real GDP growth. Every recession 
since 1970 has been preceded by expansion of less than 2 percent, though 
there was a false alarm in 1995. The second estimate of third-quarter GDP 
shows real output rising 3.2 percent over the past year (Chart 1).
Even with researchers’ considerable effort, forecasting recessions may 
be no more reliable than consulting a few indicators. The yield curve, 
which is a measure of the differences in government debt yields at various 
maturities, the unemployment rate and oil price shocks all have a good 
history of signaling downturns just before or during the first quarter of a 
recession. Still, the unique current economic environment raises questions 
about applying such indicators. 
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Chart 1
Economy “Stalls” at 2 Percent Four-Quarter Growth


















* Third-release vintage data. This refers to annual real GDP growth as it appeared when it was released for the third time. 
NOTE: Bars denote NBER recessions.
SOURCES: Bureau of Economic Analysis; Real-Time Data Research Center, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
Chart 2
Inverted Yield Curve Has Signaled Every Recession
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NOTE: Bars denote NBER recessions.
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board.
that long-term interest rates—to a great 
extent, though not perfectly—represent 
expectations of future short-term rates. 
In that case, an inverted yield curve 
indicates a market expectation that 
short-term interest rates will be lower in 
the future than they are today. Because 
interest rates tend to be procyclical—
they rise with a growing economy and 
decline with a contracting economy—
an expectation of falling interest rates 
suggests that market investors believe a 
recession lies ahead. This is reinforced 
by monetary policy. Since short-term 
interest rates hew close to the overnight 
interest rate target set by the Fed, an 
inverted yield curve is, equivalently, 
signaling an expectation that the Fed 
will soon be reducing its target interest 
rate—something that typically happens 
when recession is imminent or has 
already begun.
Before the 2008 recession, the 
inversion of the yield curve occurred 
well before the recession is dated to 
have begun. At the time, in early 2006, 
some analysts pointed to factors that 
might rationalize the inverted yield 
curve as something other than a signal 
of an impending downturn.1 Those 
factors included increased demand for 
long-maturity assets given the reduced 
probability of recessions and lower, 
less-volatile inflation during the period 
of the Great Moderation; increased 
global savings concentrated in the 
hands of a few countries that tended 
to invest their savings in U.S. capital 
markets; and increased demand for 
dollar-denominated assets by foreign 
central banks. Whether those factors 
played a role in the yield curve inver-
sion in early 2006 is open to debate.  
Unemployment Rate
An even more reliable signal 
of recession, albeit with a lag, is a 
0.33 percentage point increase in the 
three-month moving average of the 
unemployment rate from its recent 
low. This signal assumes that workers 
losing their jobs cut spending almost 
immediately. Demand for goods and 
services slides. Using revised data, 
The Yield Curve
The difference between the 
10-year Treasury yield and the one-year 
note turned negative—that is, short-
term interest rates were higher than 
long-term rates—before every recession 
in the postwar era, with one false signal 
in 1966 (Chart 2). A common explana-
tion for the predictive power of the 
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* Three-month moving average (first-release vintage).
NOTES: Red lines indicate the three-month moving average is more than 0.33 percentage points from the recent low. 
Bars denote NBER recessions.
SOURCES: Bureau of Labor Statistics; Real-Time Data Research Center, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
this unemployment jump is a flawless 
indicator in the postwar era, signaling 
every recession either before it began 




The yield curve and unemploy-
ment rate signal disarray affecting 
demand and subsequently output. 
On the supply side, oil shocks have 
figured in most U.S. recessions since 
price volatility increased in the 1970s 
(Chart 4). In fact, every recession in 
the postwar era, except in 1960 and 
1970, followed an oil price shock the 
previous year. For this analysis, an oil 
price shock is defined as the real price 
of oil exceeding the high over the pre-
vious three years.2 This is more of a 
required condition, but not solely suf-
ficient, for a recession. Volatility in the 
1990s and the gradual run-up in prices 
in the 2000s were considered oil price 
shocks under this criterion but did not 
immediately lead to recession. 
One might deduce that the oil 
price spike in 2007 had a large role 
in the latest recession. Economist 
James Hamilton suggests that if oil 
prices hadn’t increased from mid-2007 
to mid-2008, the period would have 
endured slow growth rather than 
contraction.3
Similar Slowdowns
To analyze the current slowdown, 
the third release of second-quarter 
2010 GDP is used rather than the 
second third-quarter report, which is 
subject to an additional revision. There 
have been 20 slowdowns similar to the 
current one since 1955, with nine lead-
ing to a recession.4 Economic growth 
picked up in the other 11 instances, 
averting a recession (Table 1).
All of the slowdowns that led to 
a recession had two or three signals 
of recession, mostly accompanied by 
yearly GDP growth of 2 percent or 
less. The current slowdown has zero 
signals. This indicates that a recession 
in the near future is unlikely. So why 
does concern of a double dip persist?
Concerns and Caveats
The yield curve’s steep upward 
slope suggests a low probability 
of a recession in the coming year. 
Nonetheless, many economists are 
reluctant to rely on this indicator 
because the curve’s shape and slope 
have been distorted by the Federal 
Chart 4
Oil Price Shocks Precede Recessions
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NOTES: Red lines indicate a price higher than the previous three years’ maximum. Bars denote NBER recessions.
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Reserve’s unconventional monetary 
policy: a near-zero federal funds rate 
and a quantitative-easing program that 
damped intermediate- and longer-term 
Treasury rates. With near-zero short-
term rates, it is almost impossible for 
a yield curve inversion, that is, short-
term rates exceeding longer-term ones.   
There is some reason to believe 
the unemployment rate could climb 
again. Claims for jobless benefits remain 
at a level usually associated with an 
increasing unemployment. Even if the 
rate does not increase, it remains ele-
vated, straining the overall recovery.
While the current real price of oil 
does not fit the criterion of a shock, 
it sits at levels only seen in the early 
1980s and 2006–08. An oil supply 
shock would be especially damaging 
to the already weak recovery.  
Most forecasters project growth at 
2 to 3 percent over the next year, but 
not gaining sufficient momentum to 
advance safely above stall speed. 
Until this situation is resolved, policy-
makers will continue facing pressure 
to pursue fiscal and monetary mea-
sures to guide the economy toward 
full employment and more robust 
growth.
Rosenblum is the director of research and an 
executive vice president at the Federal Reserve 
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1956:Q1 N N N 3.6 N
1957:Q2 Y Y Y 1.7 Y
1960:Q3 Y Y N 2.6 Y
1963:Q1 N N N 4.1 N
1964:Q4 N N N 4.4 N
1966:Q2 Y N N 5.9 N
1967:Q1 Y N N 2.5 N
1969:Q2 Y Y N 3.0 Y
1970:Q1 Y Y N 0.2 Y
1974:Q1 Y Y Y 0.2 Y
1978:Q1 N N N 3.8 N
1979:Q2 Y N Y 1.9 Y
1980:Q1 Y Y Y 1.0 Y
1984:Q3 N N N 6.1 N
1995:Q2 N N N 3.3 N
1999:Q2 N N N 3.9 N
2000:Q4 Y Y Y 3.4 Y
2001:Q2 Y Y Y 1.2 Y
2003:Q1 N Y N 2.0 N
2006:Q3 Y N Y 3.0 N
2010:Q2 N N N 3.0 ?
* First-release vintage. ** Third-release vintage.
SOURCES: Bureau of Economic Analysis; Real-Time Data Research Center, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia; Federal 
Reserve Board; Bureau of Labor Statistics.